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The paper analyzes how the structure of interaction networks aects
the diusion patterns and market shares of dierent products under
local network eects and imperfect information.
The diusion of the dierent products/technologies in the market
is modelled as the result of two (only partly) interrelated dynamics: i)
the interaction between idiosyncratic individual thresholds and local
network eects; ii) the diusion of the information about the product
(via broadcast diusion and word-of-mouth).
The average clustering coecient a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in case of small-world networks, despite the high clustering coecient
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increase in the speed of di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11 Introduction
Thanks to important seminal works (e.g. Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Albert
and Barab asi, 2002), social and economic networks are now the subject
of a fast growing body of literature, ranging from the analysis of learning
processes, consensus formation (e.g. Golub and Jackson, 2009) and risk-
sharing (e.g. Bramoull e and Kranton, 2007), to the analysis of industrial
clusters (e.g. Morrison, 2008) and R&D collaborations among rms (e.g.
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001).1
Within the economics of innovation, network analysis has been fruitfully
applied to study the processes of knowledge creation and diusion (Cowan
and Jonard, 2003, 2004), as well as the patterns of adoption and diusion of
innovations (e.g. Morris, 2000; Delre et al., 2007; L opez-Pintado, 2008).
As far as this last stream of research is concerned, along with a number
of works that model diusion as a stochastic process of \percolation" in a
grid (Frenken et al., 2008; Hohnisch et al., 2008; Delre et al., 2010), thus
assuming regular structures, economists have also started analyzing the
eects of dierent network structures on the process of innovation diusion
with local externalities (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997; Arenas et al.,
2002; Lee et al., 2006).
Our contribution belongs to this last body of research. We study a model
of product diusion with many incompatible products competing for cus-
tomers, mainly focusing on demand-side dynamics. In particular, we extend
the model studied in Lee et al. (2006) by considering more than two products
and distinguishing the case of: i) perfect information, where customers are
perfectly informed about the existence of the dierent products and can
freely choose among them, assuming that each agent has got an idiosyncratic
basic willingness to adopt and he/she is also in
uenced by his/her neighbors'
adoption choices, given the existence of local network eects; from that of
ii) imperfect information, where not all potential customers are informed
about products' availability at each moment and such an information diuses
through the network by word-of-mouth (direct contact with adopters) and
broadcasting (e.g. advertising or marketing), like it usually happens in
marketing models (e.g. Bass, 1969; Bemmaor and Lee, 2002), therefore in a
way partly independent on the agents' current adoption choices.
To start with, we focus on how the network structure can in
uence the
speed of diusion of a single product/technology in a population of agents
characterized by idiosyncratic individual thresholds of adoption under the two
regimes (perfect vs. imperfect information). We show that, while with perfect
information, where all the agents are aware of the existence of the product
and dier only in their individual willingness to adopt, the product diuses
1For a thorough and concise survey see, for instance, Newman (2003) and Uzzi et al.
(2007). Introductory textbooks are Goyal (2009),Vega-Redondo (2007) and Jackson (2008).
2faster when the network is completely random, with imperfect information, it
is the small-world network (with its high clustering and low average distance)
the most suitable for a prompt diusion.
Then, we extend the analysis to incorporate the process of competition
among alternative products. In particular, we analyze how the interplay
between the network structure and the information regime can aect the
probability of coexistence of the dierent products in the market. We are thus
able to show that, in a world characterized by imperfect information, winner-
take-all solutions { where one product corners the market and completely
displaces the others { are more frequent than expected, even in markets
characterized by strong social cohesion, and they become signicantly more
frequent when the average distance of the network is rather low, as it usually
happens in real social networks, despite a high clustering.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie
y reviews the relevant
literature on the role of local network eects in product/innovation diusion.
Section 3 presents the model and its main specications. Section 4 discusses
the results of the simulation experiments. Section 5 concludes summing up
the main results.
2 Theoretical background
Although the literature on innovation/product diusion is vast and hetero-
geneous, the role played by the network topology in the process has been
studied only recently.2
This has allowed to properly deal with issues related with local exter-
nalities, such as the eects that neighbors' in
uence is likely to have on
adoption decisions. In particular, in markets characterized by uncertainty,
it has been widely acknowledged that consumers base their own decision
on the information derived from previous adopters, so generating a social
bandwagon pressure to conform. When uncertainty is very high, and thus
potential adopters are likely to receive information on the product of dierent
intensity, agents tend to base their decisions on social cues (Abrahamson
and Rosenkopf, 1997).
In this respect, Delre et al. (2007) fruitfully join the literature on innova-
tion diusion { considering both epidemic and threshold models { with the
marketing literature, which deals with the diusion of products in fashionable
markets, where social in
uence is extremely important (Bass, 1969, 2004;
Chatterjee and Eliashberg, 1990). In particular, they model both individual
agents' preferences and network eects arising from word-of-mouth processes,
thus providing an eective description of the diusion process of a single
2Comprehensive surveys are Karshenas and Stoneman (1995), Geroski (2000) and
Rogers (2003).
3product; and their results suggest that the speed of diusion is higher in
small-world networks and that agents' heterogeneity helps diusion.3
Albeit important in showing the role played by the dierent network
structures on the diusion patterns, this contribution does not analyze the
processes of diusion for many incompatible products, competing for the
same user base, nor it does analyze how the network topology enters the
process, shaping the nal outcome.
In fact, the last point is strongly related with the issue of how the actual
structure of social relations among consumers determines an outcome of
technological standardization (or winner-take-all solution) vs. coexistence.
To our knowledge, only two contributions have tried to cope with this
issue so far: Lee et al. (2006) and Uchida and Shirayama (2008). The
former investigates the role played by the structure of social networks in a
market where two incompatible products/technologies compete for the same
population of adopters. They nd that, in networks characterized by strong
social cohesion (high clustering coecient), the winner-take-all hypothesis
is no more sustainable, and the usual outcome is one of coexistence for
the competing products, even when one of the two experiences a larger
installed base. They conclude that overemphasizing the role played by global
network eects, while ignoring local ones, can produce a bias in favor of
winner-take-all outcomes.
Uchida and Shirayama (2008) show that this important result holds
also when the strength of the local network eect is driven by a positive
correlation between node degree in the network. In this case, the force that
drives coexistence solutions comes from an evolving mechanism in which
neighboring nodes of neighbors of a node are more likely to be connected
than non-neighboring nodes.4
In what follows, besides considering more than two products, we extend
Lee et al.'s (2006) analysis by taking into account two alternative information
regimes { perfect vs. imperfect information {, and study if and how the
results reached under the former hold also under the latter.
3In another important recent contribution, Young (2009) groups diusion models into
three broad classes: i) contagion, where agents adopt when they come in contact with
other adopters; ii) social in
uence, where people adopt when enough other people in the
group have adopted; and iii) social learning, where people adopt once they see enough
empirical evidence to convince them that the innovation is worth adopting. However, he
employs a mean-eld approach in the analysis, so as deliberately neglecting the eects of
network topology on the diusion process.
4The probability of outcomes with coexistence is increased when one introduces the
possibility for agents to jointly adopt two or more products. In this vein, see, for instance,
Goyal and Janssen (1997) and Mahdian et al. (2007).
43 The model
Let N = f1;2;:::;Ng be the set of agents. Each agent is a vertex in a
undirected binary network   = (N;G), where G is the set of links. Let Ni
be the set of agent i's neighbors:
Ni = fj 2 N n fig : (i;j) 2 Gg
X = f1;2;:::;Xg is the set of available products and a(t) 2 (f0g [ X)N the
vector of agents' actions, whose generic element ai(t) is the adoption choice
of agent i at time t and ai(t) = 0 means that the agent decides not to adopt
any product.
Adoption dynamics are driven by the myopic maximization of individual
instant utilities, with agent i's utility given by:
ui(t) =
(





where therefore the utility of no adoption is 0, while the utility of the adoption
of a certain product is a function of: i) i's willingness to adopt any product
(ri); ii)  { a measure of the strength of network eects { times the fraction
of i's neighbors adopting the same product in the previous period over her
total neighbors.
In each period, every agent has the possibility to revise his/her choice,
without incurring any additional cost other than the price of the newly
bought product. Moreover, when for a certain agent in a certain period two
or more actions bring the same utility, the agent chooses randomly among
them with the same probability.
Like done by Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Lee et al. (2006), among
the others, we assume ri is heterogeneous across customers and drawn from
a normal distribution with negative mean, thus assuming that agents are
on average reluctant to adopt a new product or technology. Then the
maximization of ui(t) according to (1) implies the existence of a threshold
for adoption.
In order to analyze the case of imperfect information, we restrict the set
of actions available to each agent in each period. Formally, we assume:
a(t) 2 i2N(f0g [ Ii(t))
where Ii(t)  X is i's information set, that is the set of available products
known by agent i at time t.
We assume further that agents have got an innite memory { if x 2 Ii(t)
then x 2 Ii(t0), for all t0  t { and no prior information, i.e. Ii(0) = ; for all
i 2 N.
Information on product availability diuses through the network via
broadcasting and word-of-mouth by previous adopters. In particular, we
5assume that in each period there is a probability p that x is added to Ii(t),
where p depends on the intensity of the diusion from the central source.5
In addition, x 2 Ii(t) whenever there is at least one adopter of the product
x among i's neighbors, i.e. 9 j 2 Ni : aj(t   1) = x.
To analyze the interaction between the network structure and the diusion
dynamics of the competing products, we use the Watts and Strogatz's (1998)
model, which starts from a one-dimensional ring lattice made of n nodes with
degree k, thus assuming that each of n customers maintains k relationships
with the others. In this regular network, agents are highly clustered and
the average distance among nodes is high. To build other kinds of networks
starting from this, one can then rewire each of the links by making random
connections between nodes with a certain probability . When  is rather
small (ranging from 0.01 to 0.1), the high clustering is preserved while the few
shortcuts signicantly decrease the average distance (so-called small-world
networks). Finally, for  = 1 the network becomes completely random, and
it is therefore characterized by small clustering coecient and small average
distance.
4 Results
We implement our model as an agent-based model and present the result of
several simulations to analyze the eects of the structural features of the
network of relations on the patterns and speed of diusion of products for
the case of perfect and imperfect information.6
In particular, in Section 4.1 we study the diusion patterns of one single
product, whereas in Section 4.2 we analyze the case of 5 competing products,
studying how the probability of coexistence of the dierent products in the
market changes by changing the structure of the network and the hypothesis
of perfect vs. imperfect information.
All the simulations are made starting from a regular network of 1000
agents with degree 10 each (k = 10) and analyzing 21 dierent network
congurations with  ranging from 0.0001 to 1, equally spaced on a logarith-
mic scale. Moreover, we assume that ri is normally distributed with mean
 =  100 and standard deviation  = 50, while the strength of network
eects () is 500. Finally, as for the case of imperfect information, the
broadcasting probability p is kept low and constant, and set equal to 0.001.7
5One can in principle assume that p is dierent for each product, depending on the
marketing eorts of the rm. For an analysis of the interaction between network structure
and dierent marketing strategies on the diusion for the one product case see Delre et al.
(2007).
6The agent-based model has been implemented in the Laboratory for Simulation Devel-
opment (LSD) { http://www.labsimdev.org. The code is available from the authors at
request.
7Clearly, the higher p, the more similar the results are to the case of perfect information.
6Figure 1: Average speed of diusion with perfect (20 steps) and imperfect
(200 steps) information
Each set of simulations is averaged across 1000 runs.
4.1 Diusion of a single product
The rst result is showed in Figure 1, where the parameter  is plotted
against the speed of diusion for a single product under the two dierent










where T is the number of time steps in the simulation, F(t) is the cumulative
number of adopters at time t and f(t) the number of adopters at t.
Besides the obviously higher speed of diusion in the case of perfect
information, what is interesting to note is the dierent eect that an increase
in  has got under the two regimes. Indeed, in the case of perfect information
from a regular to a random network the speed increases monotonically
and it starts increasing for  > 0:01, when the clustering coecient starts
decreasing, so reducing the redundancy of some links and increasing the
extent of the in
uence of each adoption decision on the non adopters. On
the contrary, in the case of imperfect information, where the diusion of
information about the existence of the new product relies on both external
in
uence via broadcasting communication (e.g. advertising and mass media),
which is by assumption rather low, and word-of-mouth by previous adopters,
the speed of diusion starts increasing earlier, at values of  around 0.001,
7where the average distance starts falling, so to allow the few early adopters
to spread their in
uence faster over dierent part of the network.8 Moreover,
the peak of the speed is reached around  = 0:2, while for values of  greater
than that the speed decreases. This result is consistent with the one obtained
by Delre et al. (2007), who analyzes the diusion patterns with a similar
model, and it seems due to the fact that, by increasing  further, although
the average distance continues declining, the collapse in the redundancy of
links (measured by the steep decrease of the clustering coecient) with the
emergence of a tree-like structure reduces possible reinforcement mechanisms
in the initial steps of propagations. These tend to be important when the
process is at the beginning triggered by very few adopters and the diusion
of information by word-of-mouth, which requires previous adoption by who
diuses the information, is much stronger than the diusion of information
via broadcasting.9
These results are conrmed in Figure 2, which shows the cumulative
frequencies of adopters with respect to dierent values of  under the two
dierent information regimes. In both the cases, the four distributions,
corresponding to four dierent values of , can be ordered in terms of rst
order stochastic dominance, and, while in case of perfect information (Figure
2(a)) it is the random network case ( = 1) which is stochastically dominated
by the others { meaning that it is unambiguously the more eective in
diusing promptly the product {, under imperfect information (Figure 2(b))
it is the small-world network ( = 0:1) the dominated one.
Summing up, under perfect information, where all the agents know
about the existence of the product and they only dier in the individual
willingness to adopt, it is important to reach quickly as many would-be
adopters as possible and, in this case, the random network with its tree-
like structure better serves the purpose; with imperfect information, it is
instead the network that provides the best interplay between the shortest
way to communicate with the other people (low average distance) and social
in
uence (high clustering coecient) to be more ecient in glutting the
market.
8While in case of perfect information after one step the average number of early adopters
is about 23 (N(1 ( =))), in case of imperfect information the word-of-mouth process
is at rst usually triggered by only one early adopter. This is because the expected
number of early adopters informed via broadcasting after t steps is rather low and given
by N(1   ( =))(1   (1   p)
t).
9In the simulation experiment, the information diusion via word-of-mouth is ten
times more eective than via broadcasting: each new adopter can spread on average the




Figure 2: Average cumulative frequency of adopters
9Figure 3: Average probability of winner-take-all solutions in case of perfect
and imperfect information
4.2 Coexistence probability of competing products
In what follows, we assume that there are many incompatible products
competing for customers in the market and study how the interplay between
the network structure and the information regime can aect the probability
of coexistence of these products in the market. In so doing, we extend the
results of the relevant literature (e.g. Arthur, 1989; Goyal and Janssen, 1997;
Dalle, 1997; Cowan and Miller, 1998; Lee et al., 2006) and gain new insights
into the dynamics of competition when both the network structure and the
nature of information matter.
In particular, we analyze the simulation results with respect to the
probability of winner-take-all solutions (Figure 3) and the condence intervals
for the market shares (Figure 4) of ve incompatible products, under the
assumptions of perfect and imperfect information.
Figure 3 plots the probability of winner-take-all, dened as the share
of simulation runs in which one product tips the market, against the usual
parameter referring to the network structure.10 Data show that, when
clustering coecient is high, under perfect information there is always a
solution with coexistence: thanks to the importance attached to social
in
uence, cohesive groups of adopting agents shield against the alternative
products. This result replicates and extends the one by Lee et al. (2006),
who consider only two competing products.
Apart from this, what Figure 3 shows is that such an outcome actually
10The system is observed after 500 steps. The market shares stabilize after 30 and 200
steps in the perfect and imperfect information case respectively.
10(a) Perfect information (b) Imperfect information
Figure 4: Condence intervals for market shares
depends on the assumption of perfect information. Indeed, with imperfect
information, the importance of network congurations with a high clustering
coecient is signicantly reduced, yielding an increased winner-take-all
probability. This occurs in particular when, despite the high clustering,
the average distance is low, since this increases the speed of information
diusion by word-of-mouth across all the subgroups for the products that
happen to have an advantage after the early stages; and this in turn reduces
the probability of formation of cohesive subgroups of adopters of the other
products.
The results are conrmed by looking at Figure 4, which shows the nal
average market share for one product along with the error bars ( 2 standard
deviations).11 With perfect information (Figure 4(a)), the variability of the
market shares is constant until   0:1, which is the upper limit of the small-
world parameter space. Beyond this value, when the clustering coecient
starts decreasing, the variability increases. On the contrary, with imperfect
information (see Figure 4(b)), this variability is higher and it starts growing
earlier.
The result by Lee et al. (2006) about the low probability of winner-take
all solutions in networks characterized by high clustering strongly depends
on the assumption of perfect information.12 By relaxing this assumption,
11The market shares are on average the same for all the products and equal to 0.2,
because, apart from the external in
uence, each agent is indierent among the products
and chooses randomly among them.
Results in terms of winner-take-all probabilities and market shares distributions are
similar when one assumes that the idiosyncratic component of the utility (ri) varies for
each individual with respect to each product (rix), but these values are drawn from the
same distribution.
12Although Lee et al. (2006) are aware that \customer's information can sometimes be
biased" (p.1843), the local bias they introduce cannot be properly considered an information
bias, being related to other aspects of the social interaction/in
uence between the customer
11the probability of one of the product cornering the market is always positive
and signicantly higher. What is more, such probability sharply increases
moving from networks characterized by high average distance to networks
where such distance is low, the high clustering notwithstanding.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the assumption of imperfect information
can be easily interpreted as one of lead-lag time in the introduction of the
products into the market. Indeed, by assuming that not all of the agents in
the model are aware at the same time of the existence of all of the products,
we implicitly assume that one of the products, i.e. the one that is adopted by
the very rst agent, is actually the rst product introduced into the market
and has a lead-time advantage compared to the others. All of the remaining
products face, with dierent intensities, a disadvantage due to the lag time
experienced.
5 Conclusions
The paper analyzes the role that the structure of interaction networks
has on the diusion patterns and the markets shares of dierent prod-
ucts/technologies under local network eects and dierent information
regimes.
We put forward a theoretical model where the diusion of dierent prod-
ucts/technologies in the market is modeled as the result of two (only partly)
interrelated dynamics: (i) the interaction between idiosyncratic individual
thresholds and local network eects; (ii) the diusion of the information
about the product. As for the latter, we dierentiate between a situation
of: (a) perfect information, where customers are perfectly informed about
the existence of the dierent products and can freely choose among them;
from that of (b) imperfect information, where not all potential customers are
informed about products' availability at each moment in time and such an in-
formation diuses through the network via broadcasting and word-of-mouth
by previous adopters.
We implement the model as an agent-based model and discuss the simula-
tion results for the one-product and many-products case. With respect to the
former, under a regime of perfect information, the random network with its
tree-like structure is the one that allows to saturate the market rst, whereas
instead, under a regime of imperfect information, it is the small-world the
most ecient in glutting the market for the product, because of its high
clustering coupled with a low average distance.
For the case of many products competing in the same market, we an-
alyze the probability of one of them displacing completely the others and
cornering the market. We are thus able to show that, in a situation of
perfect information, what really matters is just the level of clustering: as far
and his/her neighbours { namely emulation, fashion, seek for exchange standards, etc.
12as it is above a certain level, there is always an outcome with coexistence
and no standardization. On the contrary, under imperfect information, the
importance of network congurations with a high clustering coecient is
signicantly reduced, yielding an increased winner-take-all probability. And
such probability increases steadily with the decrease in the average distance
of the network.
Our results actually shows that, in case of \real" social networks, charac-
terized by both high clustering and low average distance, under imperfect
information and with low marketing eorts to launch the dierent products,
the probability of an outcome with coexistence is rather low. Moreover, such
an outcome is much less probable when there are even small time lags in
the introduction of the dierent products. And this can partly explain why
marketing eorts of rms are usually quite high, so as to dump the reinforce-
ment mechanisms behind product adoption and information diusion in the
word-of-mouth processes for the competitors when the information is not
perfect.
Our ndings seems interesting in three respects. First of all, the model
developed in the paper puts together dierent streams of literature dealing
with innovation diusion. In particular, it combines the two main classes of
models: threshold (or probit) models and epidemic ones. On the one hand,
the former class takes into account the factors aecting adoption decisions
at the expense of making a restrictive assumption of perfect information.
On the other hand, the latter class of models, while properly assuming
imperfect information, also assume that, as soon as an agent gets in touch
with the product, he/she ends up adopting with a positive probability. On
the contrary, our model is a mixed model of diusion (Geroski, 2000), which
tries to put together the epidemic character of the diusion by social in
uence
(local network eects) with the threshold and idiosyncratic nature of the
adoption decision.
Second, we extend and generalize the results on the diusion of innovation
of a single product in markets characterized by fads and fashions by stressing
the inner dynamics of the phenomenon. In particular, we show that by
relaxing the assumption of perfect information, the network structure which
saturates market changes as well.
Third, we extend the results of the literature about the competition
among multiple products by taking into account more than two products
and allowing the presence of lead-lag time. In so doing, we are able to show
how the results of the previous literature strongly depend on the assumption
of perfect information (which can be interpreted as an hypothesis of absence
of lead time in the introduction of the rst product into the market).
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